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Abstract
Present paper analyzes the determinants of political consensus on rel-
evant aspects of the Social Security System and focus on the choices over
employment protection and retirement age; a theoretical model is build
where an equilibrium setup results from a political process involving three
social groups: young, low and high productivity old. Hypothesis and re-
sults of the model are tested using macro data. The aim of the analysis is
to provide some insight on the reasons why some institutional setups are
supported by voters and implemented while other don’t
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1 Introduction
Pension system and labor market reforms are widely debated issues in all in-
dustrialized countries and specially in Europe; the demographic trend and the
recent slowdown of economic growth in the EU indeed, urge politicians to revise
the setup of Social Security Systems.
A prominent role in this debate is played by employment protection regula-
tion and by mandatory retirement age. A reform of the labor market involving a
reduction in employment protection is considered an important tool to promote
economic growth; an increase in retirement age is a key element to guarantee
the viability of the pension system in the long run.
The present work considers Social Security from a wide point of view that in-
cludes in the picture mutual connections between labor market and the pension
system; this approach provides useful insights on the reasons why some institu-
tional setups are supported by voters and implemented while other don’t.
The aim of the paper is to describe the determinants of political consensus on
relevant aspects of the Social Security System and to provide some predictions
over the feasibility of different reforms. The analysis focus on the interaction
between employment protection and retirement age; an equilibrium setup for
these elements results from a political process involving three social groups:
young, low productivity and high productivity old.
Two factors are crucial in this setting: total turnover on the labor market and
unemployment risk; in particular, the first element affects income distribution
across time while the second one changes distribution across states of the world.
The degree of employment protection defines the number of exits from the
labor market due to workers selection at the firm level; in other words, it sets
total turnover between insiders and outsiders. The young generation plays the
role of the outsiders, therefore a change in employment protection produces also
a different allocation between current and old age income.
Low productivity old insiders consider employment protection as an insur-
ance device against the risk of being unemployed; the selection process indeed,
affects only these agents. High productivity old that do not risk to be fired, are
mainly concerned about their chances to get back to work if they lose the job
for reasons other than selection; a lower protection increases their probability
to be hired again and reduces unemployment risk.
Mandatory retirement sets the moment in time when a complete generational
turnover happens due to permanent non-selective exits of old insiders; this again
affects young workers’ intertemporal income allocation.
The old generation considers retirement as an insurance device to reduce the
maximum length of unemployment periods; when workers retire they substitute
wage with pension and a trade-off arises between insurance and total expected
income, if the replacement rate is less than one.
Employment protection and retirement age meet agents’ needs differently
and produce also different costs. Old workers’ retirement requires to be fi-
nanced via social security contributions in a pay-as-you-go system; a reduction
in employment protection instead, does not involves monetary expenses.
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On the other hand, while retirement realizes a complete turnover between
old and young workers, the efficiency of the selection process depends on several
factors. The main issue is the productivity gap existing between insiders being
fired and outsiders being hired; this variable results both from average human
capital in the population and from skill mismatches between labor demand and
supply.
The young generation is pivotal in the political process; when the productiv-
ity gap widens, employment protection increases while retirement age decreases.
If the gap is high the selection process has little impact on total turnover;
many low productivity workers are substituted by few high productivity agents;
early retirement is more effective than low employment protection in redistribut-
ing young workers’ income across time.
Outsiders’ preferences in this case, are similar to those of low productivity
old that mostly favor early retirement to be insured against unemployment; the
consensus of both groups converges toward a setup including high employment
protection and early retirement.
When the productivity gap is low, the selection process is particularly ef-
fective in increasing labor market turnover; intertemporal income redistribution
then, is realized reducing employment protection.
As a consequence the preferences of the young get close to those of high
productivity old workers; enhancing selection opportunities indeed, increases the
level of insurance against the unemployment risk of this last type of agents. In
order to minimize pension system costs moreover, both groups agree over a setup
for the Social Security System where no employment protection is implemented
together with late retirement.
The approach of present analysis is twofold: first a theoretical model is built
to analyze the determinants of social consensus over different setups of the Social
Security System; the second step is to test hypothesis and results of the model
through the use of macro data.
2 Related Literature
A number of papers considers the relationship between the pension system and
other aspects of Social Security in a political economy framework; the extensive
work of Mulligan, Sala-i-Martin (1999a, 1999b) provides an exhaustive com-
pendium of the main issues at a stake.
Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (2003) analyze public pensions and retirement age;
they find that, in equilibrium, the political support for a large Social Security
System relies on elderly with incomplete working history and low-ability young
that expect to retire early.
In Galasso and Conde-Ruiz (2000) pension and redistribution systems are
considered jointly; in equilibrium a welfare state characterized by generous pub-
lic pensions and a high level of income redistribution, is backed by elderly and
low-income young. Similar results are found also in Lambertini and Azariadis
(1998) where unskilled workers and retirees form the winning coalition.
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Another strain of literature considers mutual interactions between labor mar-
ket and the Social Security System.
Boeri, Conde Ruiz and Galasso (2003) focus on labor market risks consider-
ing in particular, the trade-off between employment protection legislation and
unemployment benefits; they show that two main outcomes emerge from the
political process. The first one is characterized by low unemployment benefits
and high employment protection and arises if low-skill insiders are a major-
ity; the second one includes high unemployment benefits and low employment
protection.
Recently, Brugiavini, Conde Ruiz and Galasso (2003) did consider the ef-
fects of income transfers from parents to kids; the tax rate financing the Social
Security System depends, in this setting, on the number of unemployed workers
in the economy. When the unemployment rate is high, a large number of old
parents are recipient of the welfare state; kids are less likely to find a job and
rely heavily on transfers from them. A coalition between old recipient of the
welfare state and non-emancipated kids supports a large Social Security System;
the opposite happens if the unemployment rate is low.
The present work contributes to this debate considering employment protec-
tion legislation and retirement age as the outcomes of a unique political process;
other papers analyzed such aspects of the Social Security System, but not jointly.
3 The Model
3.1 The Economy
Consider an economy where each agent lives for two periods and is young in the
first and old in the second. There is no population growth and each generation
counts the same number of individuals; the size of one cohort is normalized to
one.
Agents differ for their labor productivity: in each generation, half are high
productivity workers and half are low productivity. At time t old individuals’
type is common knowledge; the productivity of the young is observed only when
they start looking for a job.
Workers can be classified in three different types according to their age and
productivity: high productivity old, low productivity old and young workers.
Utility is a function ν (ct, ct+1) of present, ct, and future consumption, ct+1;
in particular, it is the case that:
ν (ct, ct+1) = u (ct) +
1
2
· u (ct+1)
where 12 is the intertemporal discount factor
1.
There are no saving means and output is not storable; all that is produced
within a period is also consumed.
1Equivalent results are obtained by setting the intertemporal discount factor β at a level
such that:
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Utility is influenced exclusively by own consumption; both intra-generational
(between high and low productivity old) and inter-generational (between old and
young workers) altruism are absent.
One representative firm produces a unique good that is also the numeraire;
the final good market is competitive and any quantity can be sold at the equi-
librium price.
The production function uses labor as the only input and is defined as:
Yt =
¡
a · LHPt + LLPt
¢α
where LHPt and L
LP
t are respectively the number of high and of low produc-
tivity agents employed at time t; the parameters a ≥ 1 and α ∈ [0, 1] describe
the productivity gap between the two types of workers and the technology in
use.
There are two minimum wage levels: one for low productivity workers
W
¯
LP =
α£
1
2 (a+ 1)
¤1−α
and one for high productivity agents, W
¯
HP = a·W
¯
LP .
Except for these constraints, labor market is competitive; a unique market
exists where units of efficient labor, xt, are exchanged and where each of them
cannot be paid less than W
¯
LP . The production function then, can be rewritten
as:
Yt (xt) = (xt)
α
The representative firm chooses the quantity of labor that maximizes its
profits Πt, defined as:
Πt = Yt −WLPt · xt
Despite the fact that one unit of labor has the same price, no matter if
the supplier is a high or a low productivity worker, it is assumed that the
representative firm hires high type individuals first; this is the case, for instance,
because they improve the technology in use through the introduction of more
effective routines2.
β >
log
"
1
2
µ
1− p
4
1− p
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log
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log
"
1
2
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1−p
4
1−p
2
¶2#
log
"
2(2+p)2
3
p+
13
4
+13
16
p+ 3
64
p2
# < 1
2
2Representative firm preference for high productivity workers is not explicitly modeled in
this setting; it can be shown though, that this setting is an approximation for the case where
these agents provide a reduction in production costs that approaches zero. A formal proof is
found in the appendix.
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All agents have no disutility from working and labor supply is perfectly
rigid. Old individuals work for a fraction 1+θ2 of the period and retire in the
last fraction 1−θ2 of it; the young generation remains on the labor market for
the whole period.
There are no unemployment benefits and workers get nothing if they do not
have a job.
The Social Security System awards to each retired old a fraction p ∈ (0, 1] of
his last wage. Pensions are financed by taxation on labor income; the tax rate,
τ t, is such that a balanced budget condition holds.
3.2 Timing and Structure of the Game
The unitary period is divided into two sub-periods of the same size; there are
four stages in the game, two for each subperiod.
3.2.1 First Sub-period
At time 0 the first stage begins and the political process takes place; the pa-
rameters η and θ are chosen, once and for all, after that. The first variable sets
the fraction of low productivity workers that the representative firm is allowed
to fire each period; the second one defines the fraction of the period that an old
agent actually works before retirement.
After the political process, the second stage starts; the young start looking
for jobs and reveal their type (suppose for instance, they completed a schooling
path that is a perfect signal of productivity) while a stochastic displacement
process hits the insiders. This causes half of the employed old workers to leave
the job for reasons that are not covered by employment protection such as:
bankruptcy of the firm, illness, need to move to other places, serious mistakes
or fraud, voluntary unemployment or maternity etc.; being stochastic, the dis-
placement process affects in the same measure high and low productivity agents.
The representative firm then, chooses the input quantity, x10, to offset the
outflow in labor due to displacement. High productivity individuals are hired
first; the number of incoming workers is such that, given the composition of the
unemployment pool between high and low types, the quantity of labor amounts
to x10.
3.2.2 Second Sub-period
In the second sub-period, at date 12 , the third stage begins; a selection process
takes place where, according to the outcome of the political process, a fraction
η of low productivity workers is fired.
The representative firm then, chooses the quantity, x20, to get from the mar-
ket to offset the reduction in labor due to the selection process; again high
productivity individuals are chosen first and the number of workers hired de-
pends on the composition of the unemployment pool.
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After a fraction θ of this sub-period the old retire; at date 1+θ2 the stock
of labor employed in the production decreases again. The representative firm
chooses the input quantity, x30, to get from the market; the same procedure
described before defines the hiring process.
The graph that follows displays the timing of the model:
Graph 1: Timing of the Model
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Consider now the implications of this setting on the pension system.
Notice that, since taxes are levied on labor income, whenever a young agent
gets a job he contributes to the Social Security System; therefore if θ < 1
retirement involves a net income transfer from the young to the old generation.
When η 6= 0 and θ < 1, high productivity old agents are more likely to be
employed than low productivity ones and also their expected contributions are
proportionally higher; the system then, defines also a transfer from the first to
the second type of agent.
3.3 The Political Process
The degree of protection of insider workers, η, and the mandatory retirement
age, θ result from the political process; these two variables are discrete and it
is the case that η ∈ {0; 1} and θ ∈ ©0; 12 ; 1ª. The political process is an open
agenda majority voting where each bidimensional platform (η, θ) is compared
with one alternative at a time.
A problem in this setting arises: since the young generation represents half
of the electorate, ties are possible if the whole old generation casts the same
vote. When this happens it is assumed that the choice of the old prevails; this
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is coherent with the findings of a number of papers where the pressure exerted
by the elderly drives the outcomes of the political process3.
The platform in the set
©
(0, 0) ;
¡
0, 12
¢
; (0, 1) ; (1, 0) ;
¡
1, 12
¢
; (1, 1)
ª
that gets
a majority of votes (or is chosen by the whole old generation) against any other
alternative is the Condorcet winner of the game and is implemented.
3.4 Agents’ Preferences
Given previous description of the economy, consider now the maximization prob-
lem of each type of worker.
3.4.1 High Productivity Old Workers
The maximization problem of a high productivity old worker (HP) is:
MAX
η∈{0;1},θ∈{0; 12 ;1}U
HP
0 (η, θ)
where
UHP0 (η, θ) =
1
2
· u
∙
(1 + θ)
2
· a ·W
¯
LP (1− τ) + (1− θ)
2
p · a ·W
¯
LP
¸
+
+
1
2
· η
2a− 1 · u
∙
θ
2
· a ·W
¯
LP (1− τ) + (1− θ)
2
p · a ·W
¯
LP
¸
+
+
1
2
µ
1− η
2a− 1
¶
u
∙
(1− θ)
2
p · a ·W
¯
LP
¸
Expected utility is the summation of three elements; each refers to a specific
working history of the agent.
The first one describes the event in which an high productivity worker is not
displaced in the first sub-period and works until retires.
The second element refers to the situation where the agent is displaced in
the first sub-period, but hired after the selection process; he works for a fraction
θ of the second sub-period and then retires.
The last one corresponds to the case where the worker is displaced in the
first sub-period and never hired again; he gets only the pension for the fraction
(1− θ) of the second sub-period.
3.4.2 Low Productivity Old Workers
The maximization problem of a low productive old worker (LP) is:
3See Galasso and Profeta (2002) for a survey over this issue.
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MAX
η∈{0;1},θ∈{0; 12 ;1}U
LP
0 (η, θ)
with
ULP0 (η, θ) =
1
2
(1− η)u
∙
(1 + θ)
2
·W
¯
LP (1− τ) + (1− θ)
2
p ·W
¯
LP
¸
+
+
η
2
· u
∙
1
2
·W
¯
LP (1− τ) + (1− θ)
2
p ·W
¯
LP
¸
+
+
1
2
· u
∙
(1− θ)
2
· p ·W
¯
LP
¸
Expected utility is the result of agents’ working history; a low productivity
worker may face three different situations corresponding to the elements of the
summation in the above equation.
The first situation corresponds to the case where he is not displaced in the
first sub-period and further is not fired in the next one; the agent works until
retires.
In the second case the worker is not displaced in the first sub-period, but
is fired in the second one; he works only in the first sub-period and then is
unemployed until he retires.
In the third situation the agent, displaced in the first sub-period, is never
hired again; he is unemployed until retirement.
3.4.3 Young Workers
The young maximize expected utility across two periods and solve the following
problem:
MAX
η∈{0;1},θ∈{0; 12 ;1}U
Y
0 (η, θ) = U
Y
0 (η, θ) +
1
4
· UHP1 (η, θ) +
1
4
· ULP1 (η, θ)
where
UY0 (η, θ) =
1
2
u
∙
(1− θ)
2
·W
¯
LP (1− τ)
¸
+
a+ 1
4a
· u £a ·W
¯
LP (1− τ)
¤
+
+
1
2
µ
1− a+ 1
2a
¶µ
η
2a− 1
¶
· u
ha
2
·W
¯
LP (1− τ)
i
+
+
1
2
µ
1− a+ 1
2a
¶µ
1− η
2a− 1
¶
u
∙
(1− θ)
2
· a ·W
¯
LP (1− τ)
¸
Notice that since saving means are absent and output is not storable, no
transfers across periods are possible; each agent relies on current income to
finance his consumption.
Expected utility in the first period, UY0 (η, θ) , results from the summation
of four elements.
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The first of them describes the situations where the worker happens to be a
low productivity type: he is hired only when all old agents retire and works for
a fraction (1−θ)2 of the whole period.
The remaining elements refer to the case where the agent is a high produc-
tivity worker; in particular, the second of them describes the situation where he
is hired in the first sub-period, after displacement, and works during the whole
period.
The third one corresponds to the case where the worker is hired at the
beginning of the second sub-period through the selection process.
The last element is equivalent to the first one; the worker is hired only after
retirement of old agents.
Young agents’ expected income over the two periods is constant and amounts
to W¯
LP
2 (a+ 1); the choice of a platform (η, θ) defines the optimal resource
allocation across time and states of the world.
Notice that a reduction in employment protection increases the probability
that these agents get a job after the selection process if they are high productiv-
ity types; this circumstance produces an intertemporal redistribution of income,
since young workers are more easily hired in the first period.
On the other hand an increase in η involves also a different income allocation
across states of the world; resources are diverted from the situations where the
agent is low type and transferred to situations where he is instead, high type. A
low degree of employment protection implies that the selection process is more
effective in expelling less productive workers from the employment pool; this
produces more opportunities for the high types to get back into employment
when they are displaced or looking for their first job.
A higher retirement age causes an increase in future income and a reduction
in current earnings; delaying the complete generational turnover induced by
retirement indeed, shrinks the size of the period where all young agents are
employed.
Cutting pension income through a reduction in the duration of retirement,
produces also a decrease in old age income for less productive agents; this is the
case because these workers shoulder on average, longer periods of unemploy-
ment.
4 Equilibrium Analysis
The game is sequential and requires backward induction to be solved; the equi-
librium analysis starts then, from the maximization problem of the representa-
tive firm.
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4.1 TheMaximization Problem of the Representative Firm
and the Dynamic of the Labor Market
Previous description of labor market allows to define the equilibrium strategy
of the representative firm in a very simple way4.
Notice that marginal productivity of labor equals its minimum price per
efficient unit when 12 (a+ 1) is the quantity employed in the production process;
it is indeed:
∂Yt (xt)
xt
|xt= 12 (a+1) =
α£
1
2 (a+ 1)
¤1−α =W¯ LP
Given population composition between high and low productivity agents, to-
tal labor input provided by one generation is 12 (a+ 1) and labor supply exceeds
demand if two generations are on the market; when old workers retire then, the
representative firm hires all the young and the labor market is in equilibrium.
This means that before the political process takes place old agents are the
insiders of the labor market while the young are all unemployed; the minimum
wage is set at the highest level that prevents the outsiders to get a job.
The wage rate moreover, is fixed every sub-period at W
¯
LP for low produc-
tivity workers and W
¯
HP for high productivity workers. Also labor demand does
not change across time and the representative firm holds constant the input
level at 12 (a+ 1); when labor is reduced by displacement or by the selection
process, outflowing input is exactly replaced.
Consider now the dynamic of the labor market implied by the equilibrium
strategy of the representative firm. If the level of input never changes, both
employment and unemployment rates do; indeed, the number of agents working
in the firm depends on inflows and outflows of high and low productivity workers.
The displacement process causes half of the insiders to lose their job at the
beginning of each period; the employment pool includes the whole old generation
and the expected reduction in input amounts to 14 (a+ 1).
Since is 14 (a+ 1) ≤
1
2a, high productivity young supply enough labor to
meet the decrease in input; the number of them that is hired is 14
¡
a+1
a
¢
. This
amounts to a probability 12
¡
a+1
a
¢
to get a job after displacement.
Unemployment increases from 1 (the whole young generation) to 5a−14a ≥ 1.
Unemployment composition changes; high and low productivity workers do not
represent 50% of the total each but amount respectively to 2a−14a and
3
4 .
At half of the period the number of low productivity workers employed in
the representative firm is 14 ; the selection process then, causes a decrease in
labor input amounting to η4 .
Being
¡
2a−1
4a
¢
a ≥ η4 , high productivity unemployed supply enough input to
meet labor demand; the number of them that gets a job is η4a and the probability
to be hired that these workers, either young or old, face amounts to η2a−1 .
Unemployment increases to a total of 5a−14a +
η(a−1)
4a where
2a−1−η
4a are high
productivity and 3+η4 are low productivity agents.
4A formal derivation of this result is found in Appendix 1.
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After retirement, all the young get a job and unemployment is zero.
Given the equilibrium dynamic of labor market, the balanced budget condi-
tion for the pension system requires:
τ · α
∙
1
2
(a+ 1)
¸α
= p · 1− θ
2
· α
∙
1
2
(a+ 1)
¸α
and the tax rate is set at:
τ = p · 1− θ
2
4.2 The Political Process
Consider now the political process; a Condorcet winner for the voting stage is
an equilibrium for this stage of the game.
Notice that since the electorate is a continuum, each voter has zero mass
and cannot affect the result of the election; strategic voting is excluded and it
is possible to assume that each agent expresses his preferences sincerely.
When workers turn to vote they choose the platform (θ, η) that maximizes
expected utility; in this setting a strategy for agent i, Σi, is a function of his type,
ξ, of the replacement rate, of the technology parameter and of the productivity
gap between high and low productivity workers.
Σi (ξ, p, α, a) : {HP ;LP ;Y } × [0, 1]× [0, 1]× [0,+∞)→
©
0; 12 ; 1
ª× {0; 1}
The definition of the equilibrium requires to look at the preferences of each
type of agent. The analysis that follows considers the case where agents are
risk averse; both employment protection and retirement age in fact, are used to
insure against unemployment risk.
In this framework, agents’ maximization problems are not easily solved an-
alytically unless a specific assumption on agents’ preferences is introduced; in
order to get a closed form characterization of the equilibrium, it is required that
agents’ utility function is logarithmic in income.
4.2.1 High productivity old workers
The maximization problem of these agents is:
MAXη∈{0;1},θ∈{0; 12 ;1} log
Ã
a ·W
¯
LP
2
!
+
1
2
log
h
1 + θ +
p
2
(1− θ)2
i
+
+
1
2
µ
η
2a− 1
¶
log
h
θ +
p
2
(1− θ) (2− θ)
i
+
1
2
µ
1− η
2a− 1
¶
log [p (1− θ)]+
Proposition 1 High productivity old workers’ preferred platforms are:
• ¡1, 12¢ if a < 12
⎡
⎣1 + log(
1
p+
3
4)
log
µ
4+2p
3+
p
4
¶
⎤
⎦
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• (1, 0) and (0, 0) if a ≥ 12
⎡
⎣1 + log(
1
p+
3
4)
log
µ
4+2p
3+
p
4
¶
⎤
⎦
Proof. The first derivative of high productivity workers’ expected utility with
respect to η is:
1
2
µ
1
2a− 1
¶
log
∙
1− θ
2
+
θ
p (1− θ)
¸
≥ 0
this means that if θ > 0, δU
HP (η,θ)
δη > 0 holds, while it is
δUHP (η,θ)
δη = 0, if
θ = 0; as a consequence η = 1 is preferred to η = 0 anytime θ > 0 and choosing
(0, 1) or
¡
0, 12
¢
is not optimal. The platforms (1, 0) and (0, 0) moreover, provide
the same expected utility.
If θ = 1, UHP0 (η, 1) = −∞ holds and the platform (1, 1) can be discarded.
Only (1, 0), (0, 0) and
¡
1, 12
¢
then, are possible solutions for the maximization
problem; in particular, the last alternative is preferred to the others if it is
UHP0
¡
1, 12
¢
− UHP0 (1, 0) ≥ 0 i.e. if:
1
2
µ
1
2a− 1
¶
· log
µ
1
p
+
3
4
¶
− 1
2
· log
µ
4 + 2p
3 + p4
¶
≥ 0
Solving previous inequality for a gives:
a <
1
2
⎡
⎣1 +
log
³
1
p +
3
4
´
log
³
4+2p
3+ p4
´
⎤
⎦
When the above condition holds then, the solution for high productivity old
workers’ maximization problem is
¡
1, 12
¢
; if instead, the productivity gap exceeds
this threshold, (1, 0) and (0, 0) are chosen.
Consider now the main determinants of previous results.
No employment protection always provides insurance against the unemploy-
ment risk due to displacement.
If the productivity gap is large, the probability to get a job from the rep-
resentative firm through the selection process is low; decreasing retirement age
then, turns out to be beneficial especially when the replacement rate is high. A
symmetric arguments apply to the case where the productivity gap is small.
4.2.2 Low productivity old workers
The maximization problem faced by a low productivity old worker with loga-
rithmic utility is:
MAXη∈{0;1},θ∈{0; 12 ;1} log
Ã
W
¯
LP
2
!
+
1− η
2
log
h
1 + θ +
p
2
(1− θ)2
i
+
+
η
2
log
h
1 +
p
2
(1− θ)
i
+
1
2
log [p (1− θ)]
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Proposition 2 Low productivity old workers preferred platforms are (1, 0) and
(0, 0).
Proof. Look first at the first derivative of expected utility with respect to η:
−1
2
log
∙
1 + θ · 1−
p
2 (1− θ)
1 + p2 (1− θ)
¸
≤ 0
Marginal utility of η is always negative if θ > 0; the platforms (1, 1) and¡
1, 12
¢
then, are not solutions for the maximization problem of these agents. Also
in this case moreover, when θ = 0, low productivity old workers are indifferent
to the degree of employment protection; the alternatives (0, 0) and (1, 0) provide
the same expected utility.
Notice that for θ = 1 expected utility is ULP0 (η, 1) = −∞ and the alternative
(0, 1) is not an optimal choice. The platforms (0, 0) (or equivalently (1, 0)) and¡
0, 12
¢
are possible solutions for the maximization problem.
Consider the first derivative of expected utility with respect to θ:
δULP0 (η, θ)
δθ
=
µ
1− η
2
¶
1− p (1− θ)
1 + θ + p2 (1− θ)
2 −
³η
2
´ p
2
1 + p2 (1− θ)
− 1
2
· 1
1− θ
and notice that for p ≤ 1:
δULP0 (η, θ)
δθ |η=0
=
1
2
· 1− p (1− θ)
1 + θ + p2 (1− θ)
2 −
1
2
· 1
1− θ ≤ 0
holds; this means that θ = 0 is an optimal choice whenever η = 0. Low
productivity old workers then, prefer the platforms (0, 0) and (1, 0) to
¡
0, 12
¢
and
to all other alternatives.
Consider now the determinants for the preferences of this kind of agents.
Complete employment protection represents the most effective insurance de-
vice against unemployment caused by the selection process; as a consequence
low productivity old prefer this solution when θ 6= 0.
The pension system instead, reduces the risk being unemployed until re-
tirement if displaced; since no income is earned when this happens, complete
insurance is chosen and θ is set at zero.
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4.2.3 Young workers
The maximization problem for a young worker is the following:
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Notice that, as it was the case for old workers, also young agents are indif-
ferent to the degree of employment protection when θ = 0; indeed it is:
UY0 (0, 0) = U
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0 (1, 0) =
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A second relevant observation is reported in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 For 0 < p ≤ 1 there always exists a level of productivity gap,
a∗, such that for every a > a∗, UY0 (0, 0)− UY0
¡
1, 12
¢
≥ 0 holds.
Proof. In order to have UY0 (0, 0)− UY0
¡
1, 12
¢
≥ 0, the following inequality
must hold:
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For a ≥ 1 it is:
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and the difference in expected utility provided by (0, 0) and by
¡
1, 12
¢
mono-
tonically increases with the productivity gap.
Notice further that it is:
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< 158 log 2 holds
5 .
A level for the productivity gap, a∗, such that the platform (0, 0) is preferred
to
¡
1, 12
¢
then, always exists.
Consider now the case where it is p = 1; there are no values a ≥ 1 such that
UY0 (0, 0)− UY0
¡
1, 12
¢
≤ 0 since the following inequality holds:
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From previous observations it is possible to derive young agents preferred
choice for different values of the productivity gap.
Proposition 4 Young agents preferred platforms are:
• ¡1, 12¢ if 1 < a ≤ a∗
• (0, 0) and (1, 0) if a > a∗
Proof. Any platform including θ = 1 is not optimal since UY0 (η, 1) = −∞;
this allows to discard the alternatives (0, 1) and (1, 1).
The comparison among (0, 0) (or equivalently (1, 0)) and
¡
0, 12
¢
reveals that
young agents always prefer the first platform to the second since it is UY0 (0, 0)−
UY0
¡
0, 12
¢
> 0, i.e.:
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> 0
A solution for the maximization problem of young workers then, is either (0, 0)
or
¡
1, 12
¢
. Previous proposition shows that UY0 (0, 0) ≥ UY0
¡
1, 12
¢
holds when
a > a∗; if this is the case, (0, 0) and (1, 0) are optimal choices.
If instead, it is 1 ≤ a ≤ a∗, then UY0 (0, 0) ≤ UY0
¡
1, 12
¢
holds and this implies
further that it is UY0
¡
0, 12
¢
≤ UY0
¡
1, 12
¢
; the alternative
¡
1, 12
¢
is young agents’
preferred platform.
5Notice that the quantity
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monotonically increases with p; for p = 1 15
8
log 2 < log 3
holds so that the condition log
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4−p
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8
is always verified.
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The productivity gap drives young workers’ preferences.
When a is low, the selection process effectively increases expected income in
the first period and guarantees insurance against the unemployment risk due to
displacement; young agents then, choose a low degree of employment protection
and postpone retirement.
Reducing retirement age to pursue the same scopes is more costly; the fiscal
burden indeed, increases faster than the discounted value of future pension
income, especially if the replacement rate is high.
If the productivity gap is large, the preferred level of employment protection
is low and retirement age is high; this is the case because a small number of
outsiders are hired through the selection process.
4.2.4 Voting stage equilibrium
The outcomes of the political process are described in the proposition that
follows
Proposition 5 If a > a∗, the platforms (1, 0) and (0, 0) are Condorcet winners
of the voting stage.
If 1 ≤ a ≤ a∗, the platform
¡
1, 12
¢
is a Condorcet winner of the voting stage.
Proof. Any platform including θ = 1 is not a Condorcet winner of the voting
stage since it is the case that UHP0 (η, 1) = U
LP
0 (η, 1) = U
Y
0 (η, 1) = −∞; this
allows to discard the alternatives (0, 1) and (1, 1).
The comparison between the platforms
¡
0, 12
¢
and (0, 0) (or equivalently to
(1, 0) given that agents are indifferent between them if θ = 0) reveals that the
second alternative always gets a majority against first. When η = 0, high and
low productivity old solve the same maximization problem and have identical
preferences; if previous condition holds, it is δ
0ULP0
δθ |η=0 = δ
0ULP0
δθ |η=0 ≤ 0 and
both types of workers choose (0, 0).
Given that proposition 11 shows that also young agents prefer (0, 0) to
¡
0, 12
¢
,
this last platform can be discarded.
Consider now the comparison between (0, 0) (or (1, 0)) and
¡
1, 12
¢
; notice
that if the first alternative prevails against the second, it is also a Condorcet
winner for the voting game.
Low productivity old workers always prefer the platform (0, 0) to
¡
1, 12
¢
since
ULP0 (0, 0)− ULP0
¡
1, 12
¢
> 0 holds. It is in fact:
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High productivity old and young workers choose (0, 0) if it is UHP0 (0, 0) −
UHP0
¡
1, 12
¢
≥ 0 and UY0 (0, 0)− UY0
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≥ 0; this requires respectively that:
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hold. Last inequality implies that whenever young agents prefer the platform¡
1, 12
¢
to (0, 0) the same is true also for high productivity old workers since
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holds; substituting for ULP0 (0, 0) and U
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gives indeed:
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Previous quantity is always positive given that for every p ∈ (0, 1], it is
13
8 log 2 > log
³
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Notice that when a > a∗, UY0 (0, 0) > U
Y
0
¡
1, 12
¢
holds and the platforms (0, 0)
and (1, 0) are Condorcet winners of the voting game; young and low productivity
old workers form the majority that supports this outcome.
When 1 ≤ a ≤ a∗ and UY0 (0, 0) ≤ UY0
¡
1, 12
¢
hold, it is also UHP0 (0, 0) <
UHP0
¡
1, 12
¢
; the platform
¡
1, 12
¢
, supported by young and high productivity old
workers, prevails over (0, 0).
Given that all agents prefer (0, 0) to
¡
0, 12
¢
, young workers and high pro-
ductivity old choose
¡
1, 12
¢
when compared with
¡
0, 12
¢
; the first platform then is
preferred to all the others and is the Condorcet winner of the voting game.
Indifference over the degree of employment protection when θ = 0 implies
that the platforms (0, 0) and (1, 0) are both Condorcet winners for the voting
stage when a > a∗; considering agents’ preferences when θ approaches zero
permits to restrict the set of equilibria for the political process.
Proposition 6 When a > a∗ and agents’ preferences in a neighborhood of θ = 0
are considered, it is possible to find a value for the productivity gap, a∗∗, such
that:
- the platform (0, 0) is a Condorcet winner for the voting stage if a ≥ a∗∗
- the platform (1, 0) is a Condorcet winner for the voting stage if a∗∗ < a
6Notice that the quantity
³
4−p
2−p
´
monotonically increases with p; for p = 1 13
8
log 2 < log 3
holds so that the condition log
³
4−p
2−p
´
< 13
8
is always verified.
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Proof. Low and high productivity old workers have opposite preferences with
respect to the degree of employment protection η, when θ approaches zero. The
first type of agents chooses η = 1 since, for every θ > 1, δU
HP
0 (η,θ)
δθ > 0 holds;
on the contrary low productivity old prefer η = 0 since it is δU
LP
0 (η,θ)
δθ < 0.
Young workers are pivotal in the choice between the alternatives (0, 0) and
(1, 0); consider the following transformation of the first derivative of expected
utility with respect to η, for these agents:³
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Take the limit for θ that approaches 0 to get:
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In order for η = 0 to be preferred over η = 1 previous quantity must be
negative and this requires further:
φ (a, p) =
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¶
+
1
p
− a < 0
Notice that since lima→+∞ φ (a, p) = −∞ and φ (1, p) = 1p − 1 ≥ 0 hold,
solving for the biggest value for a such that φ (a, p) = 0 defines the condition for
(0, 0) to be preferred over (1, 0); in particular, it is the case that young agents
choose the first alternative when a > a∗∗, where a∗∗ is:
a∗∗ =
1
2
"µ
2 + p
2− p +
1
p
¶
+
sµ
2 + p
2− p +
1
p
¶
− 4
µ
2 + p
2− p
¶#
If the productivity gap exceeds previous threshold, the alternative (0, 0) is a
Condorcet winner; if a ≤ a∗∗, the platform (1, 0) is the equilibrium outcome for
the voting stage.
A further observation is worthy with respect to the comparison between the
thresholds a∗ and a∗∗; it is the case that a ≥ a∗ does not imply a > a∗∗.
Consider for instance the case where a = 1 and p approaches 1; it is the case
that limp→1 UY0 (0, 0) − UY0
¡
1, 12
¢
> 0 holds while limp→1 φ (1, p) approaches
zero from below. It is indeed φ (1, p) = 1p − 1.
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In a neighborhood of p = 1 then, it is a∗∗ ≥ 1 > a∗.
A large productivity gap is required to have high employment protection and
early retirement; as the value of a decreases the equilibrium setup for the Social
Security System entails lower employment protection and later retirement.
5 Employment Protection and Retirement Age:
a Cross-Country Analysis.
In the theoretical model a positive correlation is found between the degree of
employment protection and the size of early retirement; the productivity gap is
the variable that drives the choice over these parameters and causes different
setups for the Social Security System to emerge in equilibrium.
The empirical analysis is aimed to test previous result and to provide an
explanation for the observed differences in the institutional frameworks of real
economies; this is done in the same spirit of Kristov et al. (1992), Breyer and
Craig (1995), and more recently Persson (2002).
5.1 Data Description
Institutions are slow moving mechanisms and a long period is required before
tangible reforms are implemented through the political process; the empirical
analysis then, should consider a wide time span to account for these changes
but long data series for relevant variables are not easily available. Information
scarcity is further exacerbated because the setup of the Social Security System
is defined at the national level and each country provides only one observation
per period.
Due to previous restraints, the dataset used for the estimates is a small
one; the unbalanced panel includes five year average observations over a set of
22 countries7. The considered period goes from 1980 to 1998 (for the interval
1995-1998 a four year average is used) and every statistical unit has a maximum
of four observations.
Current analysis mostly uses statistics from the OECD Databases; other
informations on specific issues are retrieved from two main sources: the Barro-
Lee Database8 and the Penn World Tables.
Employment protection and retirement age are the dependent variables in
the estimates.
The employment protection index (EPI), calculated by the OECD, measures
the first quantity; this index is the result of a procedure that assigns different
scores to 18 dimensions of the employment protection legislation, i.e. the set of
rules adopted in firing and hiring workers.
7The countries in the dataset are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mex-
ico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Poland, Slovack Republic, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, U.K. and U.S.A.
8See Barro and Lee (2000) for a description of the data.
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There are two versions of the EPI: the first one measures the protection
of regular and temporary employees, the second includes also the regulation
of collective dismissals. The ranking of the OECD countries does not change
significantly considering one index or the other; the first version then, is used
since a longer time series is available9.
The standard age of entitlements to public pension in OECD economies,
ranges from 60 to 67 for men and from 59 to 67 for women. Many countries allow
early retirement and workers can opt for a reduced pension before the standard
age; Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (2003) and Gruber and Wise (1999) moreover,
point out that exits to retirement are made available also by legislation on
disability and on unemployment benefits.
A complex bunch of provisions defines the moment in time when a worker
is entitled of a full or a reduced pension; a measurement problem then, arises
with respect to the definition of the actual retirement age. Present work uses a
measure of early retirement for that.
The early retirement index (ERI) calculated by DICE at CESifo is the second
dependent variable in the estimates; the ERI is defined as 100% minus the
participation rate for men aged 55-64.
Previous index describes the behavior of a paradigmatic worker and does not
exactly meet the requirements of current analysis; retirement legislation though,
is hardly disentangled and it is extremely difficult to calculate measures based
on institutional parameters. The ERI is considered as a proxy for this missing
information given that countries where the Social Security System provides more
and better options for early retirement should be also those where people in fact
retire earlier.
The theoretical model identifies three main explanatory variables.
The first one is the productivity gap between different workers; this quantity
is not observed in the real world, therefore the efficiency of the schooling system
is used as a proxy for it.
The share of the population aged 25 and over that completed at least the
second level of education (Atleastseccompleted), is included in the estimates;
data come from the Barro and Lee (2000) database. Under the hypothesis
that labor productivity is an increasing function of education and that marginal
productivity is decreasing, if many people attain a degree that exceeds the
mandatory primary level, the average gap between workers is going to be low.
The second explanatory variable is electorate composition; the number of
high and low productivity agents in each generation defines the probability to
be a high type worker. Consider how an increase in this variable affects the
preferences of the pivotal voters i.e. of the young.
A first effect is that the unemployment risk is reduced and consequently the
support for high employment protection decreases. On the other hand if the
selection process involves a small number of workers, total turnover is low; early
retirement is required to increase outsiders’ entries in the employment pool.
The number of high productivity agents in the electorate is measured by
9For a detailed description of he index see OECD (2004).
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the share of the population aged 25 and over, with a post-secondary level of
education completed (postseccompleted); also in this case education is used as a
proxy for labor productivity. Data come from the Barro-Lee dataset.
The last regressor is the generosity of the pension system (costbenefitratio);
this variable captures the effect of variations in the replacement rate levels that
characterize different countries. Consider how this variable affects young agents’
preferences.
A generous pension system provides a high income in the old age but requires
also high contributions; in this context, early retirement is beneficial for the
young generation because it anticipates outsiders’ entries into employment and
at the same time increases taxation on wages. The combination of these effects
realizes a balanced resource allocation over the two periods.
Employment protection is used only to reduce unemployment risk if the agent
is a low productivity type; the effect is positive both on employment protection
and on early retirement.
The variable that measures the generosity of the pension system is the ra-
tio of government revenues classified as social security contributions to public
expenditures for old age pensions; data on pension expenditures are retrieved
from the OECD Social Expenditures Database while those on social security
contributions come from the OECD Revenue Statistics.
Some controls are included in the estimates. The share of self-employment
on total (selfempl) accounts for the preferences of workers that are not directly
affected by the setup of the Social Security System; data are retrieved from
OECD (2006).
A second control is labor demand increase measured by gross per capita
GDP growth (gdpgrowth); a higher demand enhances outsiders’ entries into
employment and works as a decrease in the average productivity gap. The
Penn World Table Database provides data for this variable.
A measure of capital stock variation is also included (investmentshareofgdp);
a high level of investments fosters technological change and increases the gap
between high and low productivity workers. The investment share of total GDP
reported by the Penn World Table Database is used in the estimates.
The analysis controls for labor supply changes and in particular, for inflows of
non-resident workers (migrationrate); this variable is measured by the migration
rate and is equivalent to an increase in the productivity gap. Data come from
OECD Population and Vital Statistics Database.
5.2 Specification
In the theoretical model employment protection and retirement age are jointly
determined by the political process; the empirical specification thus, relies on
the system of simultaneous equation described below:½
y1it = α
1y2it + β
1X + γ1Z + e1i + ε
1
it
y2it = α
2y1it + β
2X + γ2Z + e2i + ε
2
it
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where y1it and y
2
it denote respectively the EPI and the ERI index, X is the
matrix of explanatory variables and Z is the matrix of control variables; the
error term includes two elements: a country specific time invariant error (e1i
and e2i ) and an idiosyncratic error (ε
1
it and ε
2
it).
The system is estimated using instrumental variables; both the Balestra and
Varadharajan-Krisnakumar (1987) generalized two-stage least square and the
Baltagi (1981) error component two-stage least square estimators were calcu-
lated. The results obtained with the first procedure are reported since there are
no significant differences between the two.
The social security contributions share of GDP, lagged one-period, is the
instrument for y1it and y
2
it.
If model predictions are correct, the dependent variables vary together; when
the value of the first is high, the same is true also for the second. Large pension
expenditures due to a high level of early retirement require proportional pay-
ments to the social security system; workers’ contributions then, are expected
to be highly correlated with both ERI and EPI and at the same time to be
uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic error terms.
Random effects and fixed effects estimators have been computed for the two
equations; the Hausman specification test pointed out that a random effects
model is preferable in the context of present analysis.
5.3 Results
Current section presents the estimates of the random effects model for the sys-
tem of equation described above; preliminary to that some test of correct spec-
ification are reported.
A Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) test is conducted to check wether or
not there is exogeneity among the dependent variables; if the null hypothesis
that an ordinary least square regression gives consistent estimates is rejected, a
system of simultaneous equations describes the data generating process and the
use of instrumental variables is justified.
A second control relies on the standard Hausman test and is intended to
choose between the fixed and the random effects specification.
Consider the first equation where the employment protection index is re-
gressed against the early retirement index and the set of explanatory and control
variables.
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Table 7: EPI Random Effects Model Estimates
The F statistics for the exogeneity test has a p-value amounting to 0.88 and
does not allow to reject the null hypothesis. The Hausman specification test
could not be conducted since the variance/covariance matrix for the coefficients
of the random effects estimates turned out to be bigger than that obtained
through a fixed effects estimate; the small size of the sample is likely to be the
main cause for this statistical problem.
The estimates for the second equation where the early retirement index
is regressed against the employment protection index returned the following
results:
Table 8: ERI Random Effects Model Estimates
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The p-value for the F statistics from the Davidson-MacKinnon test is 0.0129;
the null hypothesis is not accepted for a 5% interval of confidence. The Haus-
man test does not allow to reject the null that random effects and fixed effects
estimators are equivalent; using a common estimate for the variance/covariance
matrix of the coefficients based on the most efficient model indeed, produces a
chi-squared statistic of 0.54 (Prob > chi2 = 0.99).
Previous specification is supported by some empirical evidence; the endo-
geneity of the dependent variables is clear at least in the second equation.
The choice of the random effects model moreover, finds a partial justification
in the data especially when the second equation is considered; this result is
coherent with the findings of Breyer and Craig (1995) and with the nature of
the phenomenon under analysis.
Notice that the time component of the data has little explicative power;
the variance between is always bigger than the variance within countries; in
particular, in the second estimate, the first quantity is two times the second. The
fixed effects play a significant role and cannot be discarded without incurring
in a huge loss of information.
Dealing with standard variables and index calculated by international in-
stitutions moreover, reduces the probability that measurement errors due to
country-specific classification methods cause correlations between the regres-
sors and the time-invariant error term. Substantial arguments then, exist for
the use of a random effects model.
Consider now the results of the analysis.
In the equation where employment protection is regressed against early re-
tirement, this last variable is not significant for a 10% confidence interval but
has the positive sign predicted by the theoretical model.
All the coefficients of the explanatory variables have the expected sign and
two out of three are also statistically significant. The fraction of high productiv-
ity workers and the share of the population aged 25 and over that completed at
least the second level of education are significant respectively for a 10% and for
a 5% confidence interval and have a negative effect on the dependent variable as
predicted by the model; the regressor costbenfitsratio however, is not significant
No control variables are significant.
In the second equation where the early retirement index is regressed against
the employment protection index, the variable epi has a highly significant posi-
tive coefficient. Among the explicative variables only one out of three is signifi-
cant and has the expected sign; electorate composition indeed, is significant for
a 10% confidence interval and has a positive coefficient.
The variable Atleastseccompleted has the correct negative sign but is not
statistically significant; the generosity of the pension system is not significant
as well and also the sign of the coefficient is not the expected one.
The fraction of self-employment on total is the only significant control vari-
able; it has a negative impact on early retirement and is statistically significant
for a 5% confidence interval.
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Estimates results show that there is some evidence in the data of a direct
relationship between employment protection and retirement age; in particular,
labor market regulation affects significantly the setup of the pension system.
Two variables mostly influence the interaction between the institutional pa-
rameters under analysis: electorate composition and the productivity gap; the
first element is important for both retirement age and employment protection
while the effects of the second are concentrated on the last aspect. Furthermore
all the explanatory variables, with a unique exception, have the expected sign.
Previous observations support the description of the economy presented in
the model even if no unquestionable confirmation is found in the data.
6 Final Remarks
The present paper contributes to current debate on Social Security System by
analyzing the mutual interdependence between labor market and pension sys-
tem; in particular, the joint choices on employment protection and on mandatory
retirement age are considered.
The young generation is pivotal in the voting. An optimal solution for
these agents depends on two elements: income allocation across periods and
across states of the world; since no savings means nor insurance devices against
unemployment are available, the Social Security System is used to pursue these
scopes.
When the productivity gap is high, a low level of employment protection is
not effective in transferring resources from future to current period; moreover,
it does not guarantees a significant increase in the probability of getting a new
job when an agent is displaced and reveals to be a high productivity type.
Early retirement is chosen to enhance entries in the labor market during the
first period and to increase current income; complete employment protection is
implemented to fully insure against the state of the world where the agent is a
low type.
If the productivity gap is small, the efficacy of the selection process rises;
this enhances the opportunities to transfer income from the second period to the
first one and reduces significantly the risk of unemployment due to displacement.
As a consequence the favor of the young generation for low protection and late
retirement increases.
Under the hypothesis of logarithmic utility, the political process produces
three main outcomes.
A first one is characterized by no employment protection and late retirement
and emerges when the productivity gap is small; as this variable rises, retirement
age decreases and early retirement is implemented together with no protection.
Further increases in the productivity gap define a setup for the Social Security
System that includes complete employment protection and early retirement.
A weak direct relationship is found between employment protection and
early retirement; what causes these elements to vary together is the size of the
26
productivity gap; a support to this prediction of the model is found in the data
but there is no clear-cut evidence for it.
The empirical analysis indeed, meets with some obstacles. The first one is
data scarcity that does not allow to have long time series on institutional vari-
ables; the second one is the difficulty to find a reliable measure of the produc-
tivity gap that is robust both for the estimates concerning the pension system
and for that concerning the labor market.
Despite these shortcomings the present works provides some useful contri-
butions to the debate on Social Security System reforms. Total labor market
turnover turns out to be a crucial factor in this context; any amendment to pen-
sion system or employment protection regulation is constrained by this variable
if a political consensus is required for its implementation.
A change in the mandatory retirement age that is not coupled with a coherent
reform of the labor market then, risk to be unpopular and politically unfeasible;
the same problem arises with respect to interventions that affect employment
protection regulation and ignore the timing of retirement.
7 Appendix 1: Equilibrium for the Representa-
tive Firm Maximization Problem
Consider initially a description of the subgames where the representative firm
moves.
Right after the political process, the quantity x10 is chosen and a strategy
for the firm Σ1F is a function of its initial stock of labor, L
1
0, of the decrease in
input due to displacement, γ10 and of the technology parameter:
Σ1F
¡
L10, γ
1
0, α
¢
:
£
0, 12 (a+ 1)
¤× £0, 12 (a+ 1)¤× [0, 1]→ [0, (a+ 1)]
Notice that both L10 and γ
1
0 never exceed
1
2 (a+ 1), i.e. total labor provided
by one generation, since at the beginning of each period only old agents are
employed.
In the third stage, the representative firm chooses x20; a strategy, Σ
2
F , is a
function of previous subperiod stock of labor, L20, of input reduction due to
labor selection, γ20, and of the technology parameter:
Σ2F
¡
L20, γ
2
0, α
¢
: [0, (a+ 1)]× [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ [0, (a+ 1)]
When all old workers retire, the representative firm gets from the market
the quantity x30 of labor; a strategy Σ
3
F , is a function of the stock of input in the
period going from date 12 to date
1−θ
2 , L
3
0, of labor decrease due to old workers
retirement, γ30, and of the technology parameter:
Σ3
¡
L30, γ
3
0, α
¢
: [0, (a+ 1)]× £0, 12 (a+ 1)¤× [0, 1]→ [0, (a+ 1)]
Notice that the hiring decisions described above, change, each period, the
composition of employment and unemployment; this happens both with respect
to agents’ type (high or low productivity) and to agent’s age (old or young) and
implies that also the size of γ10, γ
2
0 and γ
3
0 are affected by the actions of the firm.
Despite it is assumed that high productivity workers get hired first, different
workers are perfectly fungible. The representative firm is indifferent with respect
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to the composition of labor input; since there are no hiring nor firing costs, also
the size of the flows is irrelevant. In order to simplify the analysis, it is possible
then, to consider the quantities γ10, γ
2
0 and γ
3
0 as exogenous parameters.
7.1 Retirement Stage
At time 1+θ2 old workers retire and the representative firm chooses the quantity
x30 of labor to get from the market; its maximization problem is the following:
V 30 =Maxx30
¡
L30 − γ30 + x30
¢α −W 30 ¡L20 − γ30 + x30¢+ 12 · V 11 £L30 ¡x30¢ , x11¤
where W 30 is current price of one unit of efficient labor and L
2
0 is defined as
follows:
L30 = L
2
0 − γ20 + x20
Future profits, V 11
£
L30
¡
x30
¢
, x11
¤
, are discounted at the same rate used for
the maximization problem of workers.
The first order condition with respect to x30 is:
δV 30
δx30
=
α
(L30 − γ30 + x30)
1−α −W
3
0 +
1
2
· δV
1
1
δx30
= 0
7.2 Selection Stage
At time 12 the representative firm can fire a fraction η of low productivity work-
ers; the stock of labor then, decreases of the quantity γ20.
The maximization problem for the representative firm is the following:
V 20 =Maxx20
¡
L20 − γ20 + x20
¢α −W 20 ¡L10 − γ20 + x20¢+ V 30 £L20 ¡x20¢ , x30¤
where W 20 is current price of one unit of efficient labor and L
1
0 is:
L20 = L
1
0 − γ10 + x10
The first order condition with respect to x20 is:
δV 20
δx20
=
α
(L20 − γ20 + x20)
1−α −W
2
0 +
δV 30
δx20
= 0
From the envelope theorem it is the case that:
δV 30
δx20
=
α
(L20 − γ20 + x20)
1−α −W
3
0
Substituting the above equation in the first order condition gives:
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δV 20
δx20
=
α
(L20 − γ20 + x20)
1−α −W
2
0 +
α
(L30 − γ30 + x30)
1−α −W
3
0 = 0
7.3 Displacement
At time 0 the displacement process causes a reduction in labor input amounting
to γ10; the representative firm solves the following maximization problem:
V 10 =Maxx10
¡
L10 − γ10 + x10
¢α −W 10 ¡L10 − γ10 + x10¢+ V 20 £L20 ¡x10¢ , x20¤
where W 10 is the current price of one unit of efficient labor and L
1
0 is:
L10 = L
3
−1 − γ3−1 + x3−1
The first order condition with respect to x10 is:
δV 10
δx10
=
α¡
L3−1 − γ10 + x10
¢1−α −W 10 + δV 20δx10 = 0
From the envelope theorem is:
δV 20
δx10
=
α
(L20 − γ20 + x20)
1−α −W
2
0
Substituting the above equation in the first order condition gives:
δV 10
δx10
=
α
(L10 − γ10 + x10)
1−α −W
1
0 +
α
(L20 − γ20 + x20)
1−α −W
2
0 = 0
7.4 The Choice of the Firm: Equilibrium
From the maximization problem of the displacement stage is possible to derive,
through the envelope theorem, the quantity δV
1
1
δx30
:
δV 11
δx30
=
α
(L11 − γ11 + x11)
1−α −W
1
1
and rewrite the first order condition relative to the retirement stage as:
δV 30
δx30
=
α
(L30 − γ30 + x30)
1−α −W
3
0 +
1
2
·
"
α
(L11 − γ11 + x11)
1−α −W
1
1
#
= 0
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Proposition 7 In equilibrium, the representative firm holds constant the level
of labor input at 12 (a+ 1). Labor market is either in equilibrium or faces excess
supply and each unit of efficient labor is paid W
¯
LP .
Proof. Guess that labor employed in the production process is always 12 (a+ 1)
and that every subperiod, the price for each unit of efficient labor is W
¯
LP .
Verify that the first order conditions are fulfilled starting from the last stage:
δV 30
δx30
=
α£
1
2 (a+ 1)
¤1−α − α£1
2 (a+ 1)
¤1−α +
1
2
·
(
α£
1
2 (a+ 1)
¤1−α − α£1
2 (a+ 1)
¤1−α
)
= 0
for the remaining two it is the case that:
δV 10
δx10
=
δV 20
δx20
=
α£
1
2 (a+ 1)
¤1−α − α£1
2 (a+ 1)
¤1−α +
α£
1
2 (a+ 1)
¤1−α − α£1
2 (a+ 1)
¤1−α = 0
Check now that on the labor market, there is either excess supply or equilibrium,
if an efficient unit of labor is paid W
¯
LP .
Notice that when all old workers retire, a complete turnover happens and the
whole young generation gets hired by the representative firm; at the beginning
of the period, all the old are employed while all the young are unemployed and
labor supply exceeds the demand.
The displacement process causes a reduction in input amounting to:
γ1t =
1
4
(a+ 1)
this is the case because the employment pool includes in the same proportion
high and low productivity workers. Moreover, since the representative firms
keeps constant the level of input, it is the case that:
x1t = γ
1
t ≤
1
2
(a+ 1)
and labor market faces excess supply since the unemployment pool includes, the
whole young generation. The representative firm then, hires only high produc-
tivity workers; indeed it is 14a ≥ γ1t .
Before the selection process, the number of low productivity workers employed
in the representative firm is 14 ; this means that labor input is reduced by the
quantity:
γ2t =
η
4
= x2t ≤
1
2
(a+ 1)
and again labor supply exceeds labor demand.
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In the last stage the old retire and the expected reduction in labor input
amounts to:
γ3t =
a
4
+
1
4
³
1− η
2
´
+
η
4
= x3t
Since the representative firm is an approximation for the whole economy, many
workers are involved in the process; the law of large numbers then, guarantees
that actual and expected values of γ3t coincide.
All the unemployed young are hired at this point and marginal productivity
of one unit of efficient labor is equal to the minimum wage; the market is in
equilibrium
8 Appendix 2: Representative Firm Preference
for High Productivity Workers
This section is aimed to give a formal justification to the assumption that high
productivity workers are preferred by the representative firm.
Consider a setup where hiring a high productivity workers reduces produc-
tion costs; representative firm profits are defined as follows:
Π = Yt −WLPt · LLPt −WHPt · LHPt + i · LHPt +
1
2
¡
Yt+1 −WLPt+1 · LLPt+1 −WHPt+1 · LHPt+1 + i · LHPt+1
¢
where the parameter i describes the decrease in costs produced by high
productivity workers (HP ).
Assume now that i is small enough to have excess supply for these agents
when both generations are present on the labor market; in other words for a ≥ 1
α · aα + i ≤ a · α£
1
2 (a+ 1)
¤1−α
must hold and marginal productivity of HP agents is smaller than their
minimum wage when they are the only employees in the firm.
The representative firm prefers to hireHP workers because, for a given stock
of input, each unit of efficient labor from these agents generates a marginal
benefit that exceeds that provided by low productivity workers (LP ) by the
factor ia and has the same cost; also the market for LP agents indeed, faces
excess supply when both generations are present on the labor market.
Consider now the decision of the representative firm when labor supply
shrinks due to retirement.
Suppose that, even if it is θ = 1, agents do not work until they die but
there is a period of length ε > 0 where the old generation exits from the labor
market. When this happens, the representative firm decides how many high
and low productivity workers to hire; the choice of the firm defines workforce
size and composition at the beginning of the next period.
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When old individuals retire, labor market faces excess demand for HP
agents; even if all workers were hired in fact, it would be:
a · α£
1
2 (a+ 1)
¤1−α + i > a · α£ 1
2 (a+ 1)
¤1−α
All HP agents then, get hired and the wage ratio equals their marginal
productivity.
The demand for LP workers instead, either exceeds or is equal to the supply
at the minimum wage. Hiring low productivity workers in this context, is bene-
ficial both because it increases overall production and because reduces HP wage
rate; on the other hand each LP agent employed limits the possibility to exploit
the reduction in costs produced by HP workers up until the selection process
(at least for those individuals that are not hit by the displacement process).
Consider now, how many of these agents get hired; it is possible to show
that if i is small enough, all the low productivity workers get a job.
In order to simplify the analysis, a ”worst case scenario” is considered where
LP individuals employed at the beginning of the period, work in the represen-
tative firm until mandatory age set at θ = 1; this amounts to say that there is
no displacement and no selection. At time 0 then, labor input derived from the
previous period is unchanged (in terms of size and composition) until retirement
unless the firm hires new workers.
The maximization problem of the firm when the old generation retires is the
following:
MaxLLPt ,LHPt ε ·
(µ
1
2
· a+ LLPt
¶α
− α£
1
2 (a+ 1)
¤1−α · LLPt − a2 · α¡1
2 · a+ LLPt
¢1−α
)
+
+
1
2
(µ
1
2
· a+ LLPt + a · LHPt+1
¶α
− α£
1
2 (a+ 1)
¤1−α · LLPt
− α · a£
1
2 (a+ 1)
¤1−α · LHPt+1 + i ·µ12 · a+ LHPt+1
¶)
Notice that the initial level of labor input is set at 12 · a since all high pro-
ductivity workers are hired after retirement.
Consider the first order conditions for the maximization problem and start
with that referred to LHPt+1:
1
2
(
α · a¡
1
2 · a+ LLPt + a · LHPt+1
¢1−α − α · a£ 1
2 (a+ 1)
¤1−α + i
)
= 0
Deriving with respect to LLPt gives:
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ε(
α¡
1
2 · a+ LLPt
¢1−α − α£1
2 (a+ 1)
¤1−α + a2 · α (1− α)¡1
2 · a+ LLPt
¢2(1−α)
)
+
1
2
(
α¡
1
2 · a+ LLPt + a · LHPt+1
¢1−α − α£1
2 (a+ 1)
¤1−α
)
= 0
Notice that from the first equation, it is the case that:
α¡
1
2 · a+ LP + a ·HP
¢1−α − α£ 1
2 (a+ 1)
¤1−α = −i
Substituting this result in the second equation gives:
ε
(
α¡
1
2 · a+ LLPt
¢1−α − α£1
2 (a+ 1)
¤1−α + a2 · α (1− α)¡1
2 · a+ LLPt
¢2(1−α)
)
− 1
2
· i
= 0
In order to have LLPt =
1
2 it must be the case that:
ε · a
2
· α (1− α)£
1
2 (a+ 1)
¤2(1−α) − 12 · i ≥ 0
holds; the above condition is always true if i approaches zero.
Assuming that the reduction in costs generated by HP workers is negligible
then, implies that a complete generational turnover happens on the labor market
after retirement. Previous result is obtained when no substitution of LP workers
is possible and retirement age is set at its maximum; the same must happen a
fortiori when displacement and selection allow to replace some low productivity
individuals and θ is less than 1.
Consider now, that if at the beginning of each period the whole old gen-
eration is employed, displacement causes a total outflow of labor amounting
to 14 (a+ 1). This decrease in input is completely compensated if only high
productivity young workers are hired; overall labor they provide indeed, is
a
2 ≥
1
4 (a+ 1).
The demand for high productivity workers is less than total supply and each
unit of labor provided by HP workers is paid α
[ 12 (a+1)]
1−α ; after displacement
then, the representative firm prefers high productivity workers to LP agents
given that for the same cost, they provide the additional benefit ia . An analogous
argument applies also to the selection stage.
The assumption that HP workers are hired first can be thought as an ap-
proximation for the setting introduced above if the benefit associated to the
hiring of HP workers are small (in the limit null) and the period in which old
individuals are forced to retire is negligible.
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